Our main result gives a way to instantiate the random oracle with a concrete hash function in "full domain hash" applications.
Introduction
Since the introduction of the Random Oracle Model by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] , a major effort in cryptography has been to understand when and if random oracles can be instantiated with families of actual hash functions while maintaining security. Over the years, we have seen real progress in this effort: Firstly we have seen the discovery of alternative schemes that do not require random oracles but achieve the same security properties as earlier schemes that do require random oracles. For example, Cramer and Shoup [CS98] achieved efficient chosen ciphertext security from DDH hard groups. As another example Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [CHK07] achieved secure IBE without random oracles, following the seminal work of [BF01] giving IBE in the Random Oracle Model. More recently, we have seen the discovery of schemes that not only work in the standard model without random oracles, but work in a manner very similar to the original schemes that used random oracles (e.g. [HSW13, FHPS13] following schemes in the random oracle model [BF01, BLS01] ). However, all of these schemes proven secure without random oracles required changing the underlying cryptographic scheme in addition to instantiating the random oracle with a concrete hash function. Thus, despite these advances, the following basic question has remained open:
Can we instantiate the random oracle with an actual family of hash functions for existing cryptographic schemes in the random oracle model, such as Full Domain Hash signatures?
In other words, can we achieve security without changing the underlying cryptographic scheme at all, but only by replacing the random oracle with a specific family of hash functions? In this work, we give the first positive answer to this question. We do this by leveraging the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI + 01, BGI + 12] that was recently achieved in the work of [GGH + 13]. Our result is particularly interesting in light of negative results on the Random Oracle Model [CGH98, GK03, BBP04] which have called into question the secure applicability of the Random Oracle Model. Our work is the first to show natural examples of schemes that were originally invented with the Random Oracle Model in mind, that nevertheless remain secure when the random oracle is specifically instantiated.
In particular, our work evades the impossibility result of Dodis, Oliveira, and Pietrzak [DOP05] , who showed that there can be no black-box construction of hash functions that allow Full-Domain Hash Signatures to be based on trapdoor permutations. Because we make use of obfuscation, our constructions are inherently non-black-box, and thus are not ruled out by this type of black-box impossibility result. This indicates that our techniques applying indistinguishability obfuscation may be useful in the future for circumventing other such black-box impossibility proofs.
Our Result. Our main result gives a way to instantiate the random oracle with a concrete hash function in "full domain hash" signatures. The full domain hash signature scheme was first proposed 1 in the original Bellare-Rogaway [BR93] paper as a way to build a signature scheme from any trapdoor permutation using the introduced random oracle heuristic. This work was very influential and formed the foundation for part of the PKCS#1 standard [KS98] . While the terminology of "full-domain hash" (FDH) originally applied to the trapdoor permutation signature scheme of Bellare and Rogaway, over time it has (informally) encompassed a broader range of notable cryptographic schemes including the Boneh-Franklin [BF01] IBE scheme, the Cock's IBE scheme [Coc01] , and Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) [BLS01] signatures. Although these schemes exist in different algebraic domains and have different aims, they share common construction and proof structures that uses random oracle programming in very similar ways.
Our work develops a methodology for replacing the programming of a random oracle in these construction using indistinguishable obfuscation in a novel manner. We begin by describing a scheme that replaces the RO hash function in the original Bellare-Rogaway trapdoor permutation (TDP) signature scheme. Our newly instantiated scheme is then proven to be selectively secure.
Let's begin by informally recalling the Bellare-Rogaway TDP-based full domain hash scheme. The signature setup algorithm generates a trapdoor permutation pair of functions g PK , g −1 SK . In addition, it chooses permutation. It would go through equally well if we only assumed that it was an injective trapdoor function.
Overcoming the black-box impossibility We can now see more precisely why our work evades the impossibility result of Dodis, Oliveira, and Pietrzak [DOP05] . Our hash function is obfuscation of code that runs the underlying permutation. The obfuscation will intuitively hide the evaluation of this code. In particular, no attacker can tell if the trapdoor permutation was actually computed on an input or whether it was a special point where the output was hardcoded in. In the DOP negative result, they build an attack oracle that specifically leverages the black box access to the TDP to watch whenever it is called. It is interesting to see this very strong correlation between the negative result and how non-black box access to a primitive and indistinguishability obfuscation can combine to circumvent it.
Getting Adaptive Security. For our next result we show how to get adaptive (or standard) signature security without complexity leveraging for the case where the trapdoor permutation is the RSA function. The use of RSA as a trapdoor permutation candidate was suggested in Bellare-Rogaway'93 [BR93] and explicitly given in Bellare-Rogaway'96 [BR96] . The public parameters in their scheme are an RSA modulus N = pq for hidden primes p, q and an RSA exponent e chosen such that gcd = σ e mod N . We develop a different set of techniques that can leverage the particular structure of the RSA function. The first new ingredient is use of admissible hash functions first introduced in the context of Identity-Based Encryption by Boneh-Boyen [BB04a] . We use a simplification due to Freire et. al. [FHPS13] . At a high level the system is a pair of a hash function h : {0, 1}
(λ) → {0, 1} n(λ) that hashes from the message space to n bit strings and an efficient randomized algorithm AdmSample. The sampling algorithm takes in the security parameter as well as second parameter Q which intuitively corresponds to the number of signature queries an attacker makes. It outputs a string u ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} n . Informally, we say that the system is admissible if the following conditions hold. Consider any sequence of Q values x 1 , . . . , x Q and x * = x i . The event we consider is where the string h(x i ) has a bit in common with u in at least one position, but h(x * ) is different from u at all positions. (Note, if u j = ⊥ then it is different at position j from all bit strings.) If this event occurs with non-negligible probability, we say it is an admissible system. Intuitively, when used in a proof of a signature scheme, the admissible hash function is utilized to partition the message space into messages that can be signed in the query phase and those that can be used in the challenge phase. A sampled string u corresponds to a particular partition. When running a reduction, one hopes that the actual signature oracle queries and forgery message align with a partition, and the reduction aborts otherwise.
To build the hash function candidate, the setup first chooses a random v ∈ Z * N as well as exponents a i,b chosen randomly in [0, φ(N )], for all i ∈ [1, n], b ∈ {0, 1}. Next, it builds the hash function as an obfuscation of the program RSA Hash. The program will first compute m = h(m). Then, it computes and outputs v Q i∈[n] a i,m i . Our proof proceeds in a few hybrid steps. In the first hybrid experiment the challenger creates a partition internally by calling AdmSample(1 λ , Q) → u for an attacker that makes at most Q = Q(λ) queries. The game aborts and declares the attacker unsuccessful if any of the query messages or forgery message violates the partition. The property of admissible hashes states any attacker with non-negligible advantage in the real game will also have non-negligible advantage here. In the next hybrid, we change the way we sample the exponents a i,b . One first chooses random y i,b ∈ [1, N ]. Then for when u i = b we set c i,b = e · y i,b . If u i = b we set c i,b = e · y i,b + 1. Note in the first case c i,b is a multiple of e and in the second case e c i,b . The values a i,b = c i,b mod φ(N ). We show that this way of choosing a values is statistically close to the previous uniform way, because gcd(φ(N ), e) = 1.
Next, we use an alternative program where we directly use the c i,b values in place of the a i,b values. Since the group Z * N is of order φ(N ) we have that v
Therefore the input/output behavior is the same between the two programs and we can argue the advantage in the hybrids for polytime attackers must be close by indistinguishability obfuscation. This is the critical hybrid experiment in that it most radically departs from previous such proofs, by leveraging indistinguishability obfuscation. Observe that this hybrid experiment eliminates the need for the reduction to know φ(N ), which is crucial to the reduction, since it uses c i,b values instead of a i,b values. However, if the values c i,b were completely visible to an attacker, they would be trivially distinguishable from the "true" uniform a i,b values. However, indistinguishability obfuscation guarantees that these values are hidden from the attacker, and that indeed the attacker cannot distinguish this hybrid from the previous one.
Finally, we show that any attacker that is successful in the last hybrid can be used to break the RSA assumption. For any signature query message m that respects the partition, the reduction will view H(m) as v raised to some integer that is a multiple of e and taking the e-th root is then easy. Any forgery on m * that respects the partition, the reduction will view H(m * ) as v z for some z where gcd(e, z) = 1 and from this can derive v 1/e .
BLS Signatures and More
We extend our techniques to replacing the random oracle in the BLS [BLS01] signature scheme. In Section 5 we give a candidate that has a selective proof of security based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (along with indistinguishability obfuscation). In Section 6, we give an adaptive proof of security based on an assumption equivalent to the n-Diifie-Hellman inversion assumption. The high level structures of these are similar to the respective selective and adaptive construction and proof methods above. The lower level mechanisms are adapted to the context of bilinear groups. Finally, in Section 7 we sketch how the BLS ideas extend to the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme.
Other Related Work
Recently, the work of [BHK13] looked at a complementary question of identifying a definitional abstraction to replace the random oracle heuristic in many random oracle-based constructions. The abstraction is a notion of security called UCE (Universal Computational Extractor). The authors emphasize that a random oracle is known not to exist and "behaves like a random oracle" is not a rigorously defined property, whereas UCE is a well defined property of a hash function. They then show how several previous constructions proven secure in the random schemes can be proven secure if we assume the hash functions are UCE secure. One can then conjecture that standard cryptographic hash functions like SHA-256 may satisfy the UCE security notion. In contrast, our work is focused on providing new candidate constructions for hash functions, that allow for a security proof to work with the original constructions in the random oracle model. Interestingly, the work of [BHK13] does not encompass the case of Full Domain Hash signatures, arguably one of the most natural and well-studied constructions in the Random Oracle Model, that we address here.
Preliminaries
In this section, we define indistinguishability obfuscation, and variants of pseudo-random functions (PRFs) that we will make use of. All the variants of PRFs that we consider will be constructed from one-way functions.
Indistinguishability Obfuscation
The definition below is from [GGH + 13]; there it is called a "family-indistinguishable obfuscator", however they show that this notion follows immediately from their standard definition of indistinguishability obfuscator using a non-uniform argument.
Definition 1 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator (iO)). A uniform PPT machine iO is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class {C λ } if the following conditions are satisfied:
• For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ C λ , for all inputs x, we have that
• For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT adversaries Samp, D, there exists a negligible function α such that the following holds: if Pr[∀x,
In this paper, we will make use of such indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits:
Definition 2 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator for P/poly). A uniform PPT machine iO is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly if the following holds: Let C λ be the class of circuits of size at most λ. Then iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the class {C λ }.
Such indistinguishability obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits were constructed under novel algebraic hardness assumptions in [GGH + 13].
Constrained PRFs
We first consider some simple types of constrained PRFs [BW13, BGI13, KPTZ13] , where a PRF is only defined on a subset of the usual input space. We focus on puncturable PRFs, which are PRFs that can be defined on all bit strings of a certain length, except for any polynomial-size set of inputs:
Definition 3. A puncturable family of PRFs F mapping is given by a triple of Turing Machines Key F , Puncture F , and Eval F , and a pair of computable functions n(·) and m(·), satisfying the following conditions:
• [Functionality preserved under puncturing] For every PPT adversary A such that A(1 λ ) outputs a set S ⊆ {0, 1} n(λ) , then for all x ∈ {0, 1} n(λ) where x / ∈ S, we have that:
• [Pseudorandom at punctured points] For every PPT adversary (A 1 , A 2 ) such that A 1 (1 λ ) outputs a set S ⊆ {0, 1} n(λ) and state τ , consider an experiment where K ← Key F (1 λ ) and K S = Puncture F (K, S). Then we have
where Eval F (K, S) denotes the concatenation of Eval F (K, x 1 )), . . . , Eval F (K, x k )) where S = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is the enumeration of the elements of S in lexicographic order, negl(·) is a negligible function, and U denotes the uniform distribution over bits.
For ease of notation, we write F (K, x) to represent Eval F (K, x). We also represent the punctured key Puncture F (K, S) by K(S).
The GGM tree-based construction of PRFs [GGM84] from one-way functions are easily seen to yield puncturable PRFs, as recently observed by [BW13, BGI13, KPTZ13] . Thus we have:
If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions n(λ) and m(λ), there exists a puncturable PRF family that maps n(λ) bits to m(λ) bits.
Next we consider families of PRFs that are with high probability injective:
RSA Assumption and Shamir's Lemma
We begin by recalling (one of the) standard versions of the RSA assumption [RSA78] .
Assumption 1 (RSA). Let λ be the security parameter. Let positive integer N be the product of two λ-bit, distinct odd primes p, q. Let e be a randomly chosen positive integer less than and relatively prime to φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Given (N, e) and a random y ∈ Z * N , it is hard to compute x such that x e ≡ y mod N .
We also make use of the following lemma due to Shamir.
Lemma 1 (Shamir [Sha83] ). Given x, y ∈ Z N together with a, b ∈ Z such that x a = y b (mod N ) and gcd(a, b) = 1, there is an efficient algorithm for computing z ∈ Z N such that z a = y (mod N ).
Bilinear Groups and the CDH Assumption
Let G and G T be groups of prime order p. A bilinear map is an efficient mapping e : G × G → G T which is both: (bilinear) for all g ∈ G and a, b ← Z p , e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab ; and (non-degenerate) if g generates G, then e(g, g) = 1.
Assumption 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman). Let g generate a group G of prime order p ∈ Θ(2 λ ). For all p.p.t. adversaries A, the following probability is negligible in λ:
The n-Diffie-Hellman Inversion Assumption and Equivalent Formulation
Our Section 6 construction of adaptively secure BLS signatures makes use of the n-Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption [BB04b] . This is a parameterized family of assumptions, where the number of group elements involved increases with n.
Assumption 3 (n-Diffie-Hellman Inversion). Let h generate a group G of prime order p ∈ Θ(2 λ ). For all p.p.t. adversaries A, the following probability is negligible in λ:
We will actually use an equivalent assumption, which is easier to work with in our proof. We call the assumption the n-DHI Equivalent assumption for the purposes of this paper. The assumption is stated as follows.
Assumption 4 (n-DHI Equivalent). Let g generate a group G of prime order p ∈ Θ(2 λ ). For all p.p.t. adversaries A, the following probability is negligible in λ:
We briefly sketch why an attacker A on the new assumption implies an attacker on the n-DHI assumption.
Thus an efficient attacker to the n-DHI Equivalent problem implies one to the n-DHI problem. The other direction of equivalence follows in an analogous manner.
Full-Domain Hash Signatures (Selectively Secure)
In this section, we revisit the Bellare-Rogaway Full-Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme [BR93, BR96] , and show how to make it selectively secure in the standard model by instantiating the random oracle in a specific way. We stress that we do not modify the Bellare-Rogaway FDH signature scheme in any way; the only new aspect of our construction is our instantiation of the random oracle with a specific function whose description becomes part of the public key.
Recall that the Bellare-Rogaway FDH signature scheme required a trapdoor permutation family. Our method, in fact, not only applies to trapdoor permutation families, but indeed to any injective trapdoor function family. We prove the selective security of the FDH signature scheme based on the security of the indistinguishability obfusctor, the security of a puncturable PRF family, and the security of an injective trapdoor function family.
For simplicity of exposition, we assume that there is a polynomial (λ) which denotes the length of messages to be signed; we denote this message space by M = {0, 1}
(λ) . More generally, a collision-resistant hash function may be used to hash messages to this size.
The setup algorithm first runs TDFSetup(1 λ ) and that produces a public index PK along with a trapdoor SK, yielding the map g PK : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} w together with its inverse. Next, the setup algorithm chooses a puncturable PRF key K for F where (λ) → {0, 1} w , which acts as the random oracle type hash function in the Bellare-Rogaway scheme.
The verification key VK consists of the trapdoor index PK as well as the hash function H(·). The secret key is the trapdoor SK as well as H(·).
n .
- Theorem 2. If our obfuscation scheme is indistingishuably secure, F is a secure punctured PRF, and the injective trapdoor function is secure, then the above signature scheme is selectively secure.
We describe a proof as a sequence of hybrid experiments where the first hybrid corresponds to the original signature security game. We prove that a poly-time attacker's advantage must be negligibly close between each successive one. Then, we show that any poly-time attacker in the final experiment that succeeds in forging with non-negligible probability can be used to invert the injective trapdoor function.
• Hyb 0 : In the first hybrid the following game is played:
1. The attacker selectively gives the challenger the message m * .
2. The TDF index is chosen by the challenger running TDFSetup(1 λ ).
3. K is chosen as a key for the puncturable PRF. • Hyb 1 : Is the same as Hyb 0 except we let z * = g PK (F (K, m * )) and let VK be the obfuscation of the program Verify Signature* of Figure 2.
• Hyb 2 : Is the same as Hyb 1 except z * = g PK (t) for t chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1} n .
Lemma 2. If our obfuscation scheme is indistinguishability secure, then the advantage of a poly-time attacker in Hyb 0 is negligibly close to the advantage in Hyb 1 .
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the indistinguishability security of the obfuscator. To do so, we must build the two algorithms Samp and D. Samp(1 λ ) behaves as follows: It invokes the adversary to obtain m * and the adversary's state τ . It runs TDFSetup(1 λ ) to obtain PK and SK. It then chooses K as a key for the puncturable PRF. It sets z * = g PK (F (K, m * )). It sets τ = (m * , PK, SK, K, τ ) and builds C 1 as the program for Full Domain Hash, and C 2 as the program for Full Domain Hash*.
Before describing D, we observe that by construction and the functionality preservation property of puncturable PRFs, the circuits C 1 and C 2 always behave identically on every input. Because of padding, both C 1 and C 2 have the same size. Thus, Samp satisfies the conditions needed for invoking the indistinguishability property of the obfuscator. Now, we can describe the algorithm D, which takes as input τ as given above, and either the obfuscation of C 1 , which is the program Full Domain Hash, or C 2 , which is the program Full Domain Hash*. D creates the verification key for the signature scheme by combining PK with the obfuscated program as the hash function description. It then invokes the adversary on this verification key, and the adversary then makes requests for signatures on messages m = m * . For each such message, D constructs the signatures g
, through its knowledge of K within τ . Finally, the attacker sends a forgery σ * and wins if Verify(m * , σ * ) = 1. If the attacker wins, D outputs 1.
By construction, if D receives an obfuscation of C 1 , then the probability that D outputs 1 is exactly the probability of the adversary winning in hybrid Hyb 0 . On the other hand, if D receives an obfuscation of C 2 , then the probability that D outputs 1 is the probability of the adversary winning in hybrid Hyb 1 .
The lemma follows.
Lemma 3. If our confined PRF is secure, then the advantage of a poly-time attacker in Hyb 1 is negligibly close to the advantage in Hyb 2 .
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the pseudorandomness property at punctured points for punctured PRFs. To do so, we must build the algorithms A 1 and A 2 . A 1 (1 λ ) simply invokes the adversary to obtain the challenge message m * and state τ , and outputs the singleton set S = {m * } and τ = (1 λ , τ ). A 2 obtains as input τ , the punctured key K S , the singleton set S = {m * }, and either a value t * = F (K, m * ) or a uniformly random value t * . Then, A 2 invokes TDFSetup(1 λ ) to obtain PK and SK. Now given t * , it can compute z * = g PK (t * ). Note that this yields either the z * value computed in hybrid Hyb 1 or in hybrid Hyb 2 . Since it knows K S , now A 2 can obfuscate the program Full Domain Hash*, and then execute the adversary and answer its signature queries using the punctured key K S . Finally, A 2 outputs 1 if the adversary succeeds.
By construction, the pseudorandomness property for punctured PRFs implies the lemma.
Lemma 4. If our injective trapdoor function is hard to invert, then the advantage of a poly-time attacker in Hyb 2 is negligible.
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the one-wayness of the injective trapdoor function. To do so, we build an inverting algorithm Inv. Inv takes as input a public index PK for an injective trapdoor function, and a target z * = g PK (t * ) for some (as yet unknown) random value t * . The algorithm Inv then invokes the adversary to obtain m * , and chooses a PRF key K and builds the punctured key K(S) where S = {m * }. It uses this key, together with PK and z * , to obfuscate the program Full Domain Hash*. It can then execute the adversary, and use its knowledge of K(S) to answer all adversary signing queries. The adversary then terminates with an attempted forgery σ * on message m * . By the definition of the program Full Domain Hash*, this forgery can only be valid if g PK (σ * ) = z * , and because g PK is injective, this can only happen if σ * = t * . Thus if the adversary is successful, Inv can output σ * as a valid pre-image of z * . We observe that by construction of Inv, the probability of success of Inv is exactly the probability that the attacker succeeds in hybrid Hyb 2 . The lemma follows.
These three lemmas together yield our main theorem that the above full domain hash signature scheme is selectively secure.
Adaptively Secure RSA Full Domain Hash Signatures
We first describe at a high level what advantage indistinguishability obfuscation gives us in this situation: In several previous constructions of adaptively secure schemes in the plain model starting with the adaptively secure IBE scheme of [BB04a] , a special hash function was chosen that allowed for a "partitioning" proof of security. In essence, for this to work, the hash function should have two "modes":
• In the "normal" mode, the hash function's parameters are typically just chosen at random, and it behaves like an ordinary hash function.
• In the "partitioning" mode, the hash function parameters are chosen according to a special distribution. This special distribution allows for the efficient computation of the inverse of the hash value for a large fraction of points, but it has the property that computing the inverse of the hash value at any other point is computationally hard.
It is crucial that the input/output functionality of the hash function should be identical in the two modes, and we will also use this property. However, in previous proofs (like [BB04a] ), it was also critical that the hash function parameters in "partitioning" mode be information theoretically indistinguishable from the parameters in "normal" mode, and thus the partition should be hidden from the adversary even when given the hash function parameters. This restriction significantly limited the applicability of this technique, as it could only be applied with algebraic structures that allowed for such "pseudorandom" hash parameters.
Thanks to indistinguishability obfuscation, however, we can avoid this restriction by obfuscating the hash function description. Thus, even if the natural hash function parameters in "partitioning" mode clearly reveal the partition and thus are distinguishable from normal parameters, because the resulting hash function is functionally identical to a hash function in "normal" mode, the obfuscated hash function must hide the partition, and this allows the proof of adaptive security to go through. In describing our signature scheme, For simplicity of exposition, we assume that there is a polynomial (λ) which denotes the length of messages to be signed; we denote this message space by M = {0, 1} (λ) .
More generally, a collision-resistant hash function may be used to hash messages to this size. Below, for any polynomial in λ, after the first mention of this polynomial, we will often suppress the dependence on λ for ease of notation. Thus, below often we will simply refer to the size of messages to be signed by . Before describing our construction, we first recall a (simplified) description of the notion of admissible hash functions due to [BB04a] . Our definition is a slight variation of the simplified definition due to [FHPS13] .
Definition 4. Let , n and θ be efficiently computable univariate polynomials. We say that an efficiently computable function h : {0, 1}
(λ) → {0, 1} n(λ) , and an efficient randomized algorithm AdmSample, is θ-admissible if the following condition holds:
For any u ∈ ({0, 1} ∪ {⊥}) n , define P u : {0, 1} → {0, 1} as follows: P u (x) = 0 iff ∀i : h(x) i = u i , and otherwise (if ∃i : h(x) i = u i ) we have P u (x) = 1.
Then we require that for any efficiently computable polynomial Q(λ), for all x 1 , . . . , x Q , z ∈ {0, 1} , where z / ∈ {x i }, we have that
where the probability is taken only over u ← AdmSample(1 λ , Q).
Theorem 3 (Admissible Function Families [BB04a] , see also [FHPS13] for a simple proof). For any efficiently computable polynomials , n, there exists an efficiently computable polynomial θ such that there exist θ−admissible function families mapping bits to n bits.
We now show that we can leverage the structure of the RSA trapdoor permutation to prove adaptive security. The use of RSA as a candidate for a trapdoor permutation was first discussed in the original BellareRogaway [BR93] paper, however, it was in [BR96] that Bellare and Rogaway gave an explicit full domain hash RSA construction. This construction formed the basis for part of the standard PKCS#1 [KS98] .
-Setup(1 λ ) : The setup algorithm first runs an RSA type setup. It chooses random primes p, q of λ bits each. We define N = p · q and φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). We let e be a random chosen integer between 1 and φ(N ) such that gcd(φ(N ), e) = 1. 1,0 , a 1,1 ) , . . . , (a n,0 , a n,1 ) each uniformly at random from the range Remark 1. For simplicity of exposition we describe computing the programs output by first computing a integer π(m ) as a product of n integers and then raising v to this mod N . In practice, it might be more efficient to incrementally raise an accumulated value to each a i,m i .
Next, it chooses integers (a
Theorem 4. If our obfuscation scheme is indistingishuably secure and the RSA assumption holds, the above signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks.
We describe a proof as a sequence of hybrid experiments where the first hybrid corresponds to the original signature security game. In the first hybrid step we do a "partitioning" of the message space. Consider a poly-time attacker that makes Q = Q(λ) signature queries m 1 , . . . , m Q and attempts to forge on message Roughly, at the beginning of Hyb 1 the challenger will now (behind the scenes) partition the message space such that a large fraction of messages will fall into a "query" space and a much smaller, but still non-negligible fraction of messages will fall into the "challenge" space. Furthermore, in this new game the attacker is only considered to have won if he both forged a signature and all his signature queries m 1 , . . . , m n fall into the query space and m * falls into the challenge space. We can show that if an attacker succeeds in the original security game (that does not have these additional restrictions on winning) with non-negligible advantage, then if will succeed in Hyb 1 with non-negligible advantage. Our system uses the Boneh-Boyen [BB04a] admissible hash function defined above, where if an attacker has advantage in Hyb 0 , he will have advantage /θ(Q) in Hyb 1 .
Compute m = h(m).

Compute the integer π(m
) = Q i∈[n] a i,m i . 3. Output v π(m ) (mod N ).
Compute m = h(m).
Compute the integer π(m
After the first proof step we prove that a poly-time attacker's advantage must be negligibly close between each successive hybrid experiment. We finally show that any poly-time attacker in the final experiment that succeeds with non-negligible probability can be used to break the RSA assumption.
• Hyb 0 : In the first hybrid the following game is played.
1. The challenger sets N = p · q and φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). It chooses e as a random chosen integer between 1 and φ(N ) such that gcd(φ(N ), e) = 1. 1,0 , a 1,1 ) , . . . , (a n,0 , a n,1 ) each uniformly at random from the range 6. The attacker finally chooses a message m * , sends a forgery σ * , and wins if Verify(VK, m * , σ * ) = 1.
The challenger chooses integers (a
• Hyb 1 : Is the same as Hyb 0 except the challenger begins by sampling a string u ∈ ({0, 1, ⊥}) n by calling AdmSample(1 λ , Q) → u, where Q is an upper bound on the number of queries made by the adversary (this could, for example, be the running time of the adversary). At the end of the experiment, the attacker is only considered to be successful if both Verify(VK, m * , σ * ) = 1 and P u (m * ) = 0 and for all messages m queried, P u (m) = 1. If the attacker is successful but this condition is not satisfied, we say that the hybrid "aborts."
• Hyb 2 : Is the same as Hyb 1 except the for the following modification. After sampling u, the challenger chooses integers (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ), . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ) in the following way. For i ∈ [n] and b ∈ {0, 1}, y i,b is chosen uniformly at random from all integers in [1, N ]. The challenger then sets
Observe that gcd(e, e · y i,b + 1) = 1, for all i, b. We note that if b = u i , then either u i = 1 − b or u i = ⊥.
Then for i ∈ [n] and b ∈ {0, 1}, it sets a i,b = (c i,b mod φ(N )).
• Hyb 3 : Is the same as Hyb 2 except the challenger creates the hash function H(·) as an obfuscation of the program RSA Hash* using the values (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ) , . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ). The "a" values are no longer computed or used.
Lemma 5. Consider a attacker that makes at most a polynomial of queries Q = Q(λ) in Hyb 0 . If the advantage of an attacker in Hyb 0 is (λ), then the advantage of the attacker in Hyb 1 will be at least (λ)/θ(Q).
In particular, any poly-time attacker with non negligible advantage in Hyb 0 will also have non-negligible advantage in Hyb 1 .
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from the function h satisfying the definition of a θ-admissibility, since the only the independent choice of u ← AdmSample(1 λ , Q) determines whether or not the hybrid aborts. Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the indistinguishability security of the obfuscator. To do so, we must build the two algorithms Samp and D. Samp(1 λ ) behaves as follows: It invokes the adversary to obtain the adversary's state τ . It runs the RSA type setup as in the real scheme to generate primes p, q and sets N = p · q and φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). It chooses e as a random integer between 1 and φ(N ) such that gcd(φ(N ), e) = 1. It sets integer d where e · d ≡ 1 mod φ(N ). It chooses v ∈ Z * N as a random element. It chooses (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ) , . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ) and (a 1,0 , a 1,1 ) , . . . , (a n,1 , a n,0 ) derived from them, as in Hyb 2 . It sets τ = (N, p, q, e, d, (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ) , . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ), (a 1,0 , a 1,1 ) , . . . , (a n,1 , a n,0 ), v, τ ) and builds C 1 as the program for RSA Hash, and C 2 as the program for RSA Hash*.
Before describing D, we observe that by construction, the circuits C 1 and C 2 always behave identically on every input. To show program equivalence, note that since Z * N is of order φ(N ) for all m , we have that
With suitable padding, both C 1 and C 2 have the same size. Thus, Samp satisfies the conditions needed for invoking the indistinguishability property of the obfuscator. Now, we can describe the algorithm D, which takes as input τ as given above, and either the obfuscation of C 1 , which is the program RSA Hash, or C 2 , which is the program RSA Hash*. D then invokes the adversary, which makes requests for signatures on messages. D constructs the signatures H(m) d , through its knowledge of d within τ . Finally, the attacker sends a forgery-message pair (σ * , m * ) and wins if Verify(VK, m * , σ * ) = 1. If the attacker wins, D outputs 1.
Lemma 8. If the RSA assumption holds, then the advantage of an poly-time algorithm in Hyb 3 is negligible.
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the RSA problem. To do so, we build algorithm B. B takes as input an RSA challenge (N, e, v) where N is the product of two (unknown) primes p, q, e is randomly chosen from N and values (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ) , . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ) above, and the value v in the RSA Hash* program will be the value v in the RSA challenge. All these steps together simulate the setup phase of Hyb 3 . Now, it runs the attacker using the initial parameters generated above.
The attacker will then make at most Q signing queries each for a message m. We denote m = h(m) and the integer π(m ) = i∈[n] c i,m i . If P u (m) = 1 B aborts and quits. Otherwise, P u (m) = 1 and there exists an i where e | c i,m i and therefore e | π(m ). B can then compute the integer t = π(m )/e and compute the (unique) signature on m as v t . Finally, the attacker will output an attempted forgery σ * on some message m * that is distinct from all the messages in the query phase. B first checks if the signature verifies and aborts if it does not. Next, it checks if P u (m * ) = 0 and aborts if that is the case. Otherwise, P u (m * ) = 0 and for all i we have gcd(e, c i,m * i ) = 1 and therefore gcd(e, π(m * )) = 1. Following Shamir's theorem [Sha83] , the attacker applies the Euclidean Algorithm to obtain integers α and β such that α · e + β · π(m * ) = 1. Therefore, since (σ
β , and we have that z e = v αe+βπ(m * ) = v. If σ * was a successful forgery, then this value z is a solution to the RSA challenge.
We observe that by construction of B, the probability of success of B is exactly the probability that the attacker succeeds in hybrid Hyb 3 . Importantly, whenever B aborted, the attacker by the rules of Hyb 3 was not considered to be successful since his queries or forgery violated the partition. The lemma follows.
Pulling together these four lemmas immediately gives our the main theorem that the above RSA full domain hash signature scheme is (adaptively) secure.
Selectively Secure BLS Signatures
We now give a concrete construction for the hash function modeled as a random oracle in the Boneh-LynnShacham (BLS) signature scheme. BLS signatures fall into a broad interpretation (see e.g., [Boy08] ) of the full domain hash paradigm of Bellare and Rogaway.
Below we give the BLS signature scheme with a concrete hash function built from an indistinguishability obfuscator. We prove the signature scheme selectively secure based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in bilinear groups and a indistinguishability obfuscator.
On a technical level this selective proof of security follows a very similar structure to that of our selectively secure scheme from trapdoor functions from Section 3. The main difference is that here we deal with the mechanics of an algebraic bilinear group instead of a trapdoor function. We present the scheme for simplicity in terms of a symmetric bilinear group, however, we remark that moving to asymmetric groups is straightforward.
As in Section 3, we assume that there is a polynomial (λ) which denotes the length of messages to be signed; we denote this message space by M = {0, 1} (λ) . More generally, a collision-resistant hash function may be used to hash messages to this size.
-Setup(1 λ ) : The setup algorithm first runs the group generator on input 1 λ to produce a description of groups G, G T of prime order p along with generator g ∈ G. These groups are related by a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . Next, it chooses a random exponent a ∈ Z p . Then, the setup algorithm chooses a puncturable PRF key K for F where F (K, ·) : {0, 1}
(λ) → Z p . Finally, it creates an obfuscation of the program BLS Selective Hash of Figure 5 . The size of the program is padded to be the maximum of itself and the program BLS Selective Hash* of Figure 6 . We refer to the obfuscated program as the function H : {0, 1} → G, which acts as the random oracle type hash function in the BLS scheme.
The verification key VK consists of the group descriptions G, G T , the order p, the generator g and A = g a as well as the hash function H(·). The secret key is a ∈ Z p as well as H(·).
-Sign(SK, m ∈ M) : The signature algorithm outputs σ = H(M ) a ∈ G.
-Verify(VK, m, σ) The verification algorithm tests if e(σ, g) ? = e(A, H(m)) and outputs accept if and only if this holds.
BLS Selective Hash
Constants: PRF key K, group generator g ∈ G. Input: Message m. Theorem 5. If our obfuscation scheme is indistingishuably secure, F is a secure punctured PRF, and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem holds in bilinear groups, then the above signature scheme is selectively secure.
We describe a proof as a sequence of hybrid experiments where the first hybrid corresponds to the original signature security game. We prove that a poly-time attacker's advantage must be negligibly close between each successive one. Then, we show that any poly-time attacker in the final experiment that succeeds in forging with non-negligible probability can be used to break the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in bilinear groups.
2. The challenger runs the group generator to produce bilinear groups G, G T of order p with generator g ∈ G. It then chooses a random exponent a ∈ Z p for the secret key and sets A = g a as part of the verification key.
3. K is chosen as a key for the puncturable PRF. 6. The attacker sends a forgery σ * and wins if Verify(m * , σ * ) = 1.
• Hyb 1 : Is the same as Hyb 0 except we let z * = g • Hyb 2 : Is the same as Hyb 1 except z * = g t for t chosen uniformly at random in Z p .
Lemma 9. If our obfuscation scheme is indistinguishability secure, then the advantage of an poly-time algorithm in Hyb 0 is negligibly close to the advantage in Hyb 1 .
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the indistinguishability security of the obfuscator. To do so, we must build the two algorithms Samp and D. Samp(1 λ ) behaves as follows: It invokes the adversary to obtain m * and the adversary's state τ . It runs the bilinear group setup on 1 λ to obtain the group descriptions G, G T , order p and generator g. It then chooses a random a ∈ Z p and sets A = g a . It then chooses K as a key for the puncturable PRF. It sets z * = g Before describing D, we observe that by construction and the functionality preservation property of puncturable PRFs, the circuits C 1 and C 2 always behave identically on every input. Because of padding, both C 1 and C 2 have the same size. Thus, Samp satisfies the conditions needed for invoking the indistinguishability property of the obfuscator. Now, we can describe the algorithm D, which takes as input τ as given above, and either the obfuscation of C 1 , which is the program BLS Selective Hash, or C 2 , which is the program BLS Selective Hash*. By construction, if D receives an obfuscation of C 1 , then the probability that D outputs 1 is exactly the probability of the adversary winning in hybrid Hyb 0 . On the other hand, if D receives an obfuscation of C 2 , then the probability that D outputs 1 is the probability of the adversary winning in hybrid Hyb 1 .
Lemma 10. If our confined PRF is secure, then the advantage of an poly-time algorithm in Hyb 1 is negligibly close to the advantage in Hyb 2 .
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the pseudorandomness property at punctured points for punctured PRFs. To do so, we must build the algorithms A 1 and A 2 . A 1 (1 λ ) simply invokes the adversary to obtain the challenge message m * and state τ , and outputs the singleton set S = {m * } and τ = (1 λ , τ ). A 2 obtains as input τ , the punctured key K S , the singleton set S = {m * }, and either a value t * = F (K, m * ) or a uniformly random value t * ∈ Z p . Then, A 2 runs the group generator on 1 λ to obtain (G, G T , p, g), chooses a random a ∈ Z p , and sets A = g a to establish portions of VK and SK. Now given t * , it can compute z * = g t * . Note that this yields either the z * value computed in hybrid Hyb 1 or in hybrid Hyb 2 .
Since it knows K S , now A 2 can obfuscate the program BLS Selective Hash*, and then execute the adversary and answer its signature queries using the punctured key K S . Finally, A 2 outputs 1 if the adversary succeeds. By construction, the pseudorandomness property for punctured PRFs implies the lemma.
Lemma 11. If the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in bilinear groups, then the advantage of an poly-time algorithm in Hyb 2 is negligible.
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the hardness of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the bilinear group G. To do so, we build a CDH attacker B. B takes as input the tuple (g, g a , g b ) for a group G of prime order p with a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . It sets A = g a as part of the verification key VK. The algorithm B then invokes the adversary to obtain m * , and chooses a PRF key K and builds the punctured key K(S) where S = {m * }. We observe that by construction of B, the probability of success of B is exactly the probability that the attacker succeeds in hybrid Hyb 2 . The lemma follows.
Pulling together these three lemmas immediately gives our the main theorem that the above full domain hash signature scheme is selectively secure.
Adaptively Secure BLS Signatures
We now give a hash function for BLS signatures that can be used to prove adaptive (or standard) security. Our proof structure will follow in a similar path to that of our adaptively secure RSA full domain hash signatures in Section 4. In particular, we will again apply an admissible hash function to partition the message space in our proof. At the same time, there are important distinctions and corresponding challenges that arise in this setting.
Again, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that there is a polynomial (λ) which denotes the length of messages to be signed; we denote this message space by M = {0, 1}
(λ) and we will often simply refer to the size of messages to be signed by . As in Section 4, we use a function h : {0, 1}
(λ) → {0, 1} n(λ) , and an efficient randomized algorithm AdmSample that is θ-admissible.
Our construction is identical to that given in Section 6 with the exception of how the setup creates the hash function. The setup first chooses uniformly at random (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ) , . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ) each in Z p . Then it obfuscates the program BLS Adaptive Hash of Figure 7 where the size of the program is padded to be the maximum of itself and the program BLS Adaptive Hash* of Figure 8 . The obfuscated program is used as the function H : {0, 1}
(λ) → G, which acts as the random oracle type hash function in the BLS scheme. Our proof of security relies on indistinguishability obfuscation and our Diffie-Hellman Inversion equivalent assumption. Namely, that given g, g a , g a 2 , . . . , g a n ∈ G, it is hard to compute g a n+1 .
BLS Adaptive Hash
Constants: Bilinear group G with generator g and exponents (c1,0, c1,1), . . . , (cn,0, cn,1) each in Zp. Input: Message m ∈ {0, 1} .
Compute m = h(m).
2. Output g We describe a proof as a sequence of hybrid experiments where the first hybrid corresponds to the original signature security game. As in Section 4, in the first hybrid step we do a "partitioning" of the message space. After the first proof step, we prove that any poly-time attacker's advantage must be negligibly close between each successive hybrid experiment. We finally show that any poly-time attacker in the final experiment that succeeds with non-negligible probability can be used to break our assumption that is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption. See Section 2.5 for more on these assumptions.
• Hyb 0 : In the first hybrid, the following game is played:
1. The challenger runs the group generator to produce bilinear groups G, G T of order p with generator g ∈ G. It then chooses a random exponent a ∈ Z p for the secret key and sets A = g a as part of the verification key. 5. The attacker finally chooses a message m * , sends a forgery σ * , and wins if Verify(VK, m * , σ * ) = 1.
• Hyb 1 : Is the same as Hyb 0 except the challenger begins by sampling a string u ∈ ({0, 1, ⊥}) n by calling AdmSample(1 λ , Q) → u, where Q is an upper bound on the number of queries made by the adversary (this could, for example, be the running time of the adversary). At the end of the experiment, the attacker is only considered to be successful if both Verify(VK, m * , σ * ) = 1 and P u (m * ) = 0 and for all messages m i queried P u (m i ) = 1. If the attacker is successful but this condition is not satisfied, we say that the hybrid "aborts."
• Hyb 2 : Is the same as Hyb 1 except the for the following modification. The challenger first chooses exponents (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ), . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ) in the following way. For i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1} it chooses random y i,b ∈ Z p and then sets Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the indistinguishability security of the obfuscator. To do so, we must build the two algorithms Samp and D.
Samp(1 λ ) behaves as follows: It invokes the adversary to obtain the adversary's state τ . It runs the bilinear group setup to obtain G, G T , p, g and then chooses a random a ∈ Z p . For i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1} it chooses random y i,b ∈ Z p and then sets
It samples a string u ∈ ({0, 1, ⊥})
n by calling AdmSample(1 λ , Q) → u, where Q is an upper bound on the number of queries made by the adversary. It sets τ = (G, g, a, (c 1,0 , c 1,1 ) , . . . , (c n,0 , c n,1 ), (y 1,0 , y 1,1 ), . . . , (y n,0 , y n,1 ), u, τ ) and builds C 1 as the program for BLS Adaptive Hash, and C 2 as the program for BLS Adaptive Hash*.
Before describing D, we observe that by construction, the circuits C 1 and C 2 always behave identically on every input. To show program equivalence, note that for all m , we have that With suitable padding, both C 1 and C 2 have the same size. Thus, Samp satisfies the conditions needed for invoking the indistinguishability property of the obfuscator. Now, we can describe the algorithm D, which takes as input τ as given above, and either the obfuscation of C 1 , which is the program BLS Adaptive Hash, or C 2 , which is the program BLS Adaptive Hash*. D then invokes the adversary, which makes requests for signatures on messages. D constructs the signatures H(m) a , through its knowledge of a within τ . Finally, the attacker sends a forgery-message pair (σ * , m * ) and wins if Verify(VK, m * , σ * ) = 1. If the attacker wins, D outputs 1. By construction, if D receives an obfuscation of C 1 , then the probability that D outputs 1 is exactly the probability of the adversary winning in hybrid Hyb 2 . On the other hand, if D receives an obfuscation of C 2 , then the probability that D outputs 1 is the probability of the adversary winning in hybrid Hyb 3 .
Lemma 15. If the Diffie-Hellman Inversion Assumption holds in bilinear group G, then the advantage of any poly-time algorithm in Hyb 3 is negligible.
Proof. We prove this lemma by giving a reduction to the Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem. To do so, we build algorithm B. B takes as input a n-DHI challenge (g, g a , g a 2 , . . . , g a n ) from a bilinear group G of prime order p, where n is the same as the output length of the admissible hash function h(·). Next, B calls AdmSample(1 λ , Q) → u, where Q is an upper bound on the number of queries made by the adversary. For i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1}, it chooses random y i,b ∈ Z p . Finally, B creates the hash function H(·) as an obfuscation of the program BLS Adaptive Hash* using the DHI challenge values, the values (y 1,0 , y 1,1 ), . . . , (y n,0 , y n,1 ) above and u. All these steps together simulate the setup phase of Hyb 3 . Now, it runs the attacker using the initial parameters above, including A = g a . The attacker will then make at most Q signing queries each for a message m. We denote m = h(m). If P u (m) = 1, B aborts and quits. Otherwise, P u (m) = 1 and there exists an i where m i = u i , meaning that the hash of m will contain a power of a that is strictly less than n. Thus, the signature can be formed using only knowledge of the DHI input and the y i,b values.
Finally, the attacker will output an attempted forgery σ * on some message m * that is distinct from all the messages in the query phase. B first checks if the signature verifies and aborts if it does not. Next, it checks if P u (m * ) = 0 and aborts if that is the case. Otherwise, P u (m * ) = 0 and for all i we have h(m * ) i = u i . This means that the hash of m * will be g a n raised to some known product of y , and thus if σ * was a successful forgery, then this root of the signature is a solution to the DHI challenge.
Pulling together these four lemmas immediately gives our the main theorem that the above BLS signature scheme is (adaptively) secure.
Extensions to Boneh-Franklin IBE and Aggregate Signatures
Boneh-Franklin IBE We can adapt our techniques for proving security of BLS signatures to the BonehFranklin [BF01] Identity-Based Encryption system. BLS signatures directly correspond to IBE private keys in the BF scheme. The proof for the BF adapts with a few minor changes:
• For proving BF selectively secure we can use the decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
• The second random oracle in the BF scheme can be replaced with an extractor.
• For proving adaptive security we use the following assumption. Namely that given g, g s , g a , g a 2 , . . . , g a n it is hard to distinguish e(g, g) a n+1 s from a random group element in G T . We note this assumption is weaker than the decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption [BGW05] .
BLGS Aggregate Signatures Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham [BGLS03] showed that the BLS signatures are aggregateable. Our results on BLS signatures translate immediately.
